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Abstract Agricultural non-point source pollution, common in water supply catch-
ments worldwide, can have significant environmental and human health impacts, and
its mitigation poses a challenge for policymakers. We used deliberative multi-criteria
evaluation (DMCE) to identify a mix and sequence of policy instruments (or policy
design) to address agricultural non-point source pollution using a case study of Cryp-
tosporidium contamination in the Myponga River water supply catchment, South
Australia. The major impediments to adoption of on-farm water quality management
and benefits for ecosystem services were identified using a landholder survey for use
as decision criteria in DMCE. The DMCE approach involved stakeholders in policy
design during two community fora held in the catchment. We developed six policy
scenarios and quantified their impact on decision criteria. The relative importance
of decision criteria was quantified using swing weights and consensus was reached
on the preferred policy scenario. The mix, sequence, and targeting of instruments in
the preferred policy scenario were refined based on information obtained through
the deliberative process. Impediments to adoption included a lack of both informa-
tion/knowledge and financial resources. The recommended policy scenario involved
targeted information, followed by an incentive program, and finally the regulation of
a mandatory code of practice for water quality management. Detailed, catchment-
specific context obtained through DMCE was critical for refining an effective mix
and sequence of policy instruments. The techniques may be readily used to select and
schedule policy instruments for effective mitigation of agricultural non-point source
pollution in other drinking water supply catchments elsewhere.
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1 Introduction
Non-point source pollution is a significant source of water quality impairment
in many countries (Huang and Xia 2001; Collins et al. 2007) including Australia
(Jansen and Robertson 2001). Pathogens such as Cryptosporidium are a particularly
important pollutant in water supply catchments because of the risk posed to human
health (MacKenzie et al. 1994; Hrudey and Hrudey 2004; Bewsell et al. 2007).
Extensive livestock agriculture is a significant source of Cryptosporidium in surface
water (Ferguson et al. 2007). Catchment-based actions such as reducing livestock
access to streams, riparian restoration and erosion control programs, and manure
and effluent management (Bewsell et al. 2007; Collins et al. 2007) can cost-effectively
mitigate Cryptosporidium risk, enhance water quality, and produce a range of other
ecosystem services (Lovell and Sullivan 2006; Bryan and Kandulu 2009; Chang et al.
2010).
However, there are many factors influencing the adoption of on-farm water
quality management measures by landholders (Rhodes et al. 2002; MacGregor
and Warren 2006; Kim et al. 2008; Prokopy et al. 2008; Greiner et al. 2009). The
relative significance of these impediments can vary both between catchments and
between individual farmers within catchments (Pannell et al. 2006; Bewsell et al.
2007). Agricultural non-point source pollution can be most effectively controlled
by focusing policy instruments (e.g. regulatory standards, economic incentives, and
suasive mechanisms) on these impediments and determinants of adoption of desired
management practices (Horan and Ribaudo 1999; Sterner 2003; Prokopy et al. 2008).
However, often, little is known about these determinants (Ma et al. 2009) or the
effectiveness of policy instruments in addressing them (Connor et al. 2008b). There
is a need to understand key determinants of adoption of water quality management
and the careful selection and scheduling of policy instruments (or policy design)
for addressing them for the effective mitigation of agricultural non-point source
pollution.
Recent studies have proposed methods for selecting environmental policy instru-
ments to address context-specific impediments to adoption. Romstad (2004) and
Pannell (2008) provide approaches for selecting policy instruments for conservation
based on economic characteristics of the problem such as the net private versus
public benefits resulting from management. Using a qualitative assessment based on
economic theory, Bewsell et al. (2007) identified that policy instruments enhancing
on-farm benefits and supported by regulation could effectively increase the adoption
of water quality management. Connor et al. (2009) developed a screening process
for selecting market-based instruments for mitigating agricultural non-point source
pollution. Ward et al. (2008) demonstrated the utility of multi-criteria evaluation
(MCE) to suggest policy features for overcoming a range of impediments to the
efficient functioning of market-based instruments for mitigating dryland salinity.
As an extension to MCE, participatory or deliberative multi-criteria evaluation
(DMCE, Proctor and Drechsler 2006; Renn 2006) has a special focus on capturing
the arguments and reasoning used by participants in MCE (Stirling 2006; MacLeod
et al. 2007). DMCE has potential to further enrich understanding of the context of
agricultural non-point source pollution for both decision-makers and stakeholders
(Mustajoki et al. 2004; Proctor and Drechsler 2006; Renn 2006) and thereby assist
policy design for enhancing adoption of on-farm water quality management.
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In this study, we designed a policy mix and sequence for addressing the most
important impediments to adoption of water quality management using a landholder
survey and DMCE. The policy design process involves five steps: (1) identify
impediments to adoption and benefits of water quality management using a land-
holder survey; (2) specify policy scenarios for overcoming impediments for use as
alternatives in DMCE; (3) quantify the impact of policy scenarios on overcoming
impediments to adoption and achieving water quality and other benefits; (4) weight
the relative importance of the impediments to, and benefits of, on-farm water quality
management and identify the preferred policy scenario; and (5) refine the preferred
policy scenario based on detailed, catchment-specific contextual understanding of
water quality management issues obtained through the deliberative process. We
applied these techniques to a case study of Cryptosporidium contamination in the
Myponga water supply catchment in South Australia. We discuss the use of these
techniques for policy design for addressing agricultural non-point source pollution
more broadly.
2 Study Area
The Myponga Reservoir supplies drinking water to more than 50,000 people in the
southern Fleurieu Peninsula, South Australia (Fig. 1). The 28 GL reservoir is entirely
fed by the 123 km2 catchment of the Myponga River.
Extensive land use, mostly beef cattle grazing and lifestyle amenity, occurs over
61% of the catchment and dairying occurs on approximately 13%. Recent trends
have seen the subdivision of dairy farms and conversion to smaller lifestyle prop-
erties. Our study focuses on properties that are both grazed by livestock and are
traversed by water courses which total 6,115 ha (49% of the study area). Within
this area there are 146 property titles >1 ha in size that run livestock with a median
property size of 27.4 ha and largest property size of 687 ha. The 32 larger commercial
properties (>50 ha) cover 3,905 ha (64% of the broad acre grazing area), with the
remainder being smaller hobby farms and lifestyle properties. Many landholders own
and share-farm multiple properties.
The unfettered access of livestock to water courses is a major factor causing
the elevated concentrations of human-infectious Cryptosporidium in source water
entering the Myponga reservoir (Bryan et al. 2009). Water-borne Cryptosporidium
infection can cause severe gastrointestinal illness in humans that can potentially be
life-threatening. The water utility SA Water has obligations to manage source water
quality in Myponga under the multi-barrier paradigm adopted under the Australian
Drinking Water Guidelines (NHMRC 2004).
The Adelaide and Mt. Lofty Ranges Natural Resources Management Board
(AMLR NRM Board) offers information to landholders through its Land Man-
agement Program. Modest financial incentives have been provided by the South
Australian Environment Protection Authority and the AMLR NRM Board for
land and water resource management (Connor et al. 2008a) and tax deductions are
available for primary producers who undertake water course management (ATO
2008). Minimum environmental duty regulations oblige landholders not to pollute
waterways under the Environment Protection Act 1993 (Section 25) and the Natural
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Fig. 1 Location and land use map of the Myponga River catchment study area
Resources Management Act 2004 (Section 131). Since 2000, government programs
have had some success in motivating adoption of a range of on-farm water quality
management practices, especially by dairy farmers (EPA 2008; Bryan et al. 2009).
However, adoption rates amongst non-dairy landholders including the beef cattle
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industry, sheep graziers, lifestyle properties, and hobby farmers were low (Bryan
et al. 2009). Bryan et al. (2009) and Bryan and Kandulu (2009) found that re-
stricting the water course access of non-dairy cattle could cost-effectively reduce
Cryptosporidium export to the Myponga reservoir by around 90% and produce a
range of other ecosystem service benefits for water quality, biodiversity, and carbon
sequestration (Lovell and Sullivan 2006; Bryan and Kandulu 2009).
3 Methods and Results
3.1 Identifying Decision Criteria
We identified impediments to the adoption of water quality management practices in
face-to-face interviews with 36 landholders in the Myponga River catchment. Land-
holders were selected by the South Australian Environmental Protection Authority
(EPA) and the DairySA industry group to provide a sample representative of the
range of land uses from across the catchment. Participants included all 16 dairy
farmers, 13 broad scale graziers, one blue gum plantation owner, two horticultur-
alists, one equestrian property owner, and three hobby farmer/lifestyle landholders.
In aggregate, participants managed more than 60% of the catchment by area. The
interview included more than 50 questions on a range of topics, in particular, the
motivators of, and impediments to adoption of water quality management practices
(see Online Supporting Material). Six major impediments to the adoption of on-
farm water quality management practices were identified from the survey responses
(Table 1) and included in the DMCE as decision criteria.
In addition, Financial Resources (Government) was included as a decision crite-
rion as some stakeholders considered on-farm management to be the responsibility
of landholders (i.e. polluter pays) and the subsidisation of private, on-farm manage-
ment an inappropriate use of public money. Five ecosystem service benefits were also
identified as being potentially important or valuable from the landholder survey and
a previous cost–benefit analysis (Bryan and Kandulu 2009) and included as decision
criteria. These included water quality, biodiversity, carbon sequestration, health risk
mitigation, and landscape amenity services (see Bryan and Kandulu 2009).
3.2 Identifying Instruments and Developing Policy Scenario Alternatives
We identified alternative policy instruments for addressing the six major impedi-
ments to adoption of water quality management based on published policy selection
guidelines and case studies for mitigating non-point source pollution (Table 2;
Sterner 2003; Harrington et al. 2004; BDA Group and EconSearch 2005).
We then developed policy scenarios in consultation with community stakeholders
in the Myponga River catchment. We held a community forum in Myponga attended
by 10 local landholders (55 were invited) in addition to project partner agency
representatives (CSIRO, EPA, SA Water, DairySA, and AMLR NRM Board).
During the forum, the sources and solutions of the water quality problem in the
Myponga catchment were discussed and the policy design process was introduced.
We then defined six policy scenarios (potential policy alternatives for achieving water
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Table 1 Impediments to the adoption of water quality management practices in the Myponga River
catchment identified in the landholder survey
Description of impediment Significance in the catchment
Knowledge access—lack of awareness of 2 dairy and 3 non-dairy respondents
impacts of land use activities and required on-farm extension programs
knowledge of how to undertake water on fencing to progress
quality management practices 2 dairy and 2 non-dairy livestock
respondents required information
on fencing to progress
Workforce availability/labour scarcity—limited 4 dairy and 5 non-dairy respondents
availability of labour and time to undertake cited a shortage of time
on-ground works, especially in the to undertake fencing
absence of adequate incentives
Trainer/advisor proficiency—limited 1 dairy and 2 non-dairy respondents
availability of knowledgeable and expressed lack of confidence in
experienced advisors as a major information provided by advisors and
impediment to adoption rely on own knowledge & experience
to make farm decisions
Organisational strength—lack of structural 6 respondents said they are motivated
and institutional arrangements for support by programs driven by industry bodies
of adoption through industry groups
or social networks
Regulatory support/impediment—absence of 3 dairy and 4 non-dairy respondents cited
appropriate regulatory support mechanisms allowing crash grazing would progress
and the need to remove regulatory impediments fencing activities. Aligning legislation/
regulation with appropriate enforcement
mechanisms and removing prohibitive
regulation would enhance adoption
in the area
Financial resources (landholders)—adoption of 5 dairy and 9 non-dairy respondents
water quality management has a high cited lack of financial resources
direct cost and poses a risk to farm income and insufficient incentives
quality and human health objectives in the catchment over 20 years) for inclusion in
the DMCE process:
Status Quo Existing policy continues unchanged (Section 2). Little increase in
adoption of water quality management practices occurs and water quality continues
at same poor/unsatisfactory level (EPA 2008; Bryan et al. 2009).
Suasion Existing incentives and regulation are complemented by a dramatic in-
crease in the amount of information provided to landholders through awareness rais-
ing, education and information, and recognition. The cost of adoption is largely borne
by landholders and cost of policy implementation is borne by government. A limited
increase in adoption of water quality management and associated improvement in
water quality is expected (BDA Group and EconSearch 2005).
Incentives Existing regulations are complemented by a range of financial incentives
for land stewardship such as auctions, payments schemes, subsidies, and rebates. This
is supported by a limited increase in education and awareness. The cost of adoption is
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Table 2 Policy instruments suitable for addressing specific impediments to adoption of water quality
management practices
Impediment Potential policy solutions
Knowledge access Suasion: general education programs; guidelines and codes
of practice; training programs; extension services
Workforce availability/ Incentives: public provision of contractor services;
labour scarcity subsidised contractor services; accreditation schemes;
stewardship schemes; subsidies and grants; rebates
Trainer/advisor proficiency Suasion: advisor training and performance monitoring schemes
Organisational strength Suasion: industry codes of practice; incentives: subsidised
information campaigns by industry associations; public-funded
information campaigns by industry associations
Regulatory support/ Regulation: process-based standards; licensing; mandatory
impediment management plans; placing a ban on risky farm practices
and acquisition; removing prohibitive regulation
Financial resources Incentives: accreditation schemes; stewardship payment
schemes; subsidies and grants; public provision
shared by landholders and government, with the cost of policy implementation borne
by government. A moderate increase in adoption of water quality management and
associated improvement in water quality is expected (Rhodes et al. 2002; Pannell
et al. 2006).
Regulation Existing regulations are strengthened to enforce the uniform adoption
of water quality management through the introduction of legislative controls, stan-
dards, bans on degrading practices, and compliance monitoring. These are supported
by limited education and information, and financial incentives. Costs of adoption
are largely borne by landholders with some contribution by government with the
costs of policy implementation and compliance monitoring borne by government.
The increase in adoption and resultant water quality improvements are expected to
be very high (BDA Group and EconSearch 2005).
Buy Back Involves the purchase of livestock properties across the catchment at
market price by government and subsequent removal of livestock and conversion
to carbon forest. This process is complemented by a communication and awareness
campaign. The costs of property purchase and policy implementation are borne by
government. The increase in adoption and resultant water quality improvements are
very high.
Policy Mix This includes suasion, incentives, and regulation sequenced in a way
that is likely to motivate adoption through addressing impediments. For example,
suasion and education first, followed by a broad incentives program and supported
by a robust regulatory framework. The cost of adoption is shared by landholders
and government, with the cost of policy implementation borne by government. The
increase in adoption and resultant water quality improvements are expected to be
high (BDA Group and EconSearch 2005).
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3.3 Quantifying the Impact of Policy Scenarios on Criteria
The impact of each policy scenario on each decision criterion (Table 3) was calcu-
lated using a variety of techniques. The impact of policy scenarios on overcoming
non-financial impediments to adoption was estimated based on contextual knowl-
edge of the catchment from the landholder survey, the first community forum, and
the results of a policy impact study conducted in the case study area (BDA Group
and EconSearch 2005).
Financial and ecosystem service impacts of the Status Quo scenario were sum-
marised from expenditure and adoption rates in the catchment since 2001 (EPA
2008). The Regulation scenario was considered to result in the management (i.e.
livestock access restriction and riparian restoration) of all water courses on livestock
properties in the catchment. Financial cost and ecosystem service benefits were taken
from Bryan and Kandulu (2009).
The Suasion, Incentives, and Policy Mix scenarios were considered to be less
effective than Regulation in motivating adoption. The financial and ecosystem
service impacts for these scenarios were estimated based on their expected success
relative to that achieved by the Regulation scenario. Financial costs under the Buy
Back scenario were calculated based on the purchase of all livestock properties with
water course access totalling 6,115 ha. A median price of $15,000/ha was used on
the basis of sales data from 68 local properties over 20 ha sold between 2005 and
2008. Landscape amenity impacts were estimated based on the scenic beauty and
recreation potential of the likely outcome of the policy scenario.
3.4 Deliberative Multi-Criteria Evaluation
A process of deliberative multi-criteria evaluation (Proctor and Drechsler 2006) of
policy scenarios was undertaken with stakeholders in the Myponga River catchment
during a second community forum in Myponga. Stakeholders were invited by mail
and telephone, and through an open invitation published in a local newspaper. A
total of 14 people attended the forum. Six local landholders participated in the
DMCE session including five that attended the first forum. This group included one
dairy farmer, one ex-dairy farmer, one sheep hobby farmer, one beef hobby farmer,
and two mixed farmers. To support the decision-making of the group two local
natural resource management representatives and six representatives from project
partner agencies with expertise in water quality, catchment and land management,
and economics and policy were also present. The aim of the community forum was
for the local stakeholders to arrive at a consensus view of the best policy alternative
to address water quality objectives in the Myponga catchment.
After the initial stakeholder review of the impact scores (Table 3) the group was
satisfied with the criteria, policy scenarios, and the impact matrix. The Buy Back
policy scenario was ruled out early on due to high economic and social costs. Quanti-
tative MCE was then undertaken using the Logical Decisions software (Smith 2007).
Participants were asked to weight the relative importance of each of the 12 decision
criteria (Table 3) using swing weights (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). Deriving
weights was an iterative process where swing weights were repeatedly revised as new
information came to hand through discussion between group members and through
interactions with experts until consensus was reached.
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To identify the best policy scenario alternative a multi-attribute utility theory-
based weighted summation approach was used (Zanakis et al. 1998). Let I be the set
of five policy scenario alternatives, J be the set of 12 decision criteria, and xij be the
impact of each policy scenario i on each decision criterion j (see Section 3.3). The
first step was to linearly transform swing weight scores w j to weights w′j which sum







Then, the raw impact scores xij were converted into utility scores uij where 0 ≤ uij ≤ 1
using a linear transform. Policy scenario alternatives were then ranked and the best





In the DMCE session, the above process was conducted live and presented to the
participants who unanimously accepted the policy scenario ranking.
During the DMCE session, detailed, context-specific information on issues sur-
rounding water quality management in the Myponga River catchment was captured.
This information was used to refine the composition and scheduling of instruments
in the preferred policy scenario alternative.
3.5 Results of Multi-Criteria Evaluation
Five criteria were considered to be equally most important including Knowledge
Access, Trainer/Advisor Proficiency, Financial Resources (Landholders), Biodiver-
sity, and Health Risk (Fig. 2). With a multi-attribute utility score over all criteria of
0.779, the policy mix scenario was the highest ranked policy scenario alternative.
The Regulation (Ui = 0.558), Incentives (Ui = 0.527), and Suasion (Ui = 0.525)
scenarios were next highest ranked, with the Status Quo (Ui = 0.376) ranked lowest.
Sensitivity analysis demonstrated the robustness of the highest ranked Policy Mix
alternative to changes in weights of the five most influential decision criteria. Criteria
weights had to be increased to at least 65% before the Policy Mix scenario was
outranked as the preferred scenario (Fig. 3).
3.6 Refinement of the Policy Mix Scenario
We synthesised and used the contextual detail obtained during the DMCE to
refine the mix and sequencing of policy instruments in the preferred Policy Mix
scenario and motivate the widespread adoption of water quality management in
Myponga. Policy instrument sequencing followed the principle that starting with
less interventionist measures (encouragement) followed and complemented by more
interventionist measures (enforcement) is more equitable and acceptable to the
community (Gunningham and Sinclair 2005). We also tried to address the most
significant impediments to adoption first.
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Fig. 2 Final consensus on swing weights w j on decision criteria illustrated using the actual interface
in Logical Decisions presented to participants in the DMCE session in Myponga
3.6.1 Specif ic Context of the Water Quality Problem
Group discussion explored in-depth a perceived disparity that professional farmers
had a much lower the impact on water quality than hobby farmers, corroborating the
findings of the landholder survey. Hobby farmers were often known to engage in a
range of unsustainable land use and management practices including overstocking,
allowing unfettered livestock access to water courses, and a lack of herd rotation.
These practices were seen as resulting from a lack of information, advice, know-how,
and interest in sustainable land management by hobby farmers. The group perceived
that tax deductions available to primary producers provide a perverse incentive for
hobby farmers to increase stocking densities beyond carrying capacity.
3.6.2 Information and Suasion
There was a general desire amongst DMCE participants for more specific informa-
tion on water quality management techniques. An effective information strategy may
include a broad education and awareness campaign around issues of overstocking
and riparian management delivered through local media. This could be comple-
mented by extension services and landholder training targeted at properties where
more stock have access to water courses (Bryan and Kandulu 2009). Despite the
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Fig. 3 Sensitivity of the ranking of policy scenario alternatives to changes in weights of the five
most highly weighted (swing weight = 100) decision criteria. The vertical line reflects the normalised
weight w′j for each criteria
higher cost to government, this approach has been demonstrated to be effective in
enhancing adoption (EPA 2008).
However, there was concern that suasive instruments risk failure because hobby
farmers show little interest in participating and have little support from social
networks. In addition, the high turn-over rate of lifestyle properties in the catchment
means that suasive efforts will need to be ongoing. In this case, more structured
instruments such as the development of a code of practice for sustainable land use
and management in water supply catchments, enforced later through regulation,
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may be more effective. The code of practice would include guidelines on best
practice management of livestock, water courses, riparian zones, and effluent. This
information could be delivered through programs tailored for hobby farmers such
as the Western Australian Government’s Small Landholder Information Service
(Government of Western Australia 2010).
These suasive instruments should occur first in the scheduling of policy instru-
ments. Suasive measures are likely to encourage some adoption very cheaply and
provide an essential informational buttress for other policy instruments.
3.6.3 Economic Incentives
Survey results and discussion in the DMCE suggest that economic incentives need
to form the core policy instrument for enhancing the adoption of water quality
management. The use of incentives involves both the removal of perverse incentives
and the establishment of payment schemes. Perverse taxation incentives may be
corrected by requiring that landholders comply with a land management code of
practice to be eligible for deductions. Incentives may occur simultaneously with or
follow the suasive instruments above.
As the cost to landholders was found to be a much stronger impediment to
adoption than cost to government, a benef iciary pays cost-sharing arrangement may
be most effective in enhancing adoption. This may involve all of the administration
and implementation (monitoring and enforcement) costs of an incentives program,
and the bulk of the direct costs of water quality management being borne by
government or the water utility. Market-based incentives programs may be used to
capture the private cost-share from landholders (Connor et al. 2008a, 2009; Ward
et al. 2008) and use existing spatial metrics to target properties impacting most on
water quality (see Bryan and Kandulu 2009).
3.6.4 Regulation
Participants agreed that stronger regulation and enforcement was an essential
component of an effective policy mix. Participants felt strongly that regulatory
institutions needed to incorporate practical flexibility for land management such as
allowing crash grazing (a short, intense grazing period during summer).
A mandatory code of practice for land use and management in water supply
catchments may be most effective in Myponga. The code of practice combines the
suasive benefits of increased education and awareness with the enhanced certainty
of regulation. Monitoring and enforcement of compliance may be relatively simply
done (e.g. by aerial survey or farm visits) although this presents an ongoing cost to
government when there are many small landholders. Information and incentives are
required to support regulatory requirements of landholders.
The mandatory code of practice may be applied immediately to properties un-
dergoing a change of ownership to oblige new landholders to comply. However,
given the heterogeneous distribution of Cryptosporidium sources in the catchment
(Bryan and Kandulu 2009) uniform regulation risks imposing high costs on some
landholders with little benefit for water quality (Gunningham and Sinclair 2005;
Strauss et al. 2007). To minimise this impact, full implementation of regulation such
as a mandatory code of practice needs to come last in the sequence. In this way,
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the major contributors to the water quality problem can be addressed more cost-
effectively through suasion and incentive-based measures.
3.6.5 Other Minor Policy Features
Government-funded land buy back and land use change may be appropriate on
a voluntary case-by-case basis. Some landholders also indicated a willingness to
restructure farms from livestock to other more sustainable land uses.
4 Discussion
Policy design in this study involved tailoring a mix of policy instruments to effectively
address impediments to adoption of water quality management. Most existing studies
addressing impediments to adoption of water quality management have tended
to evaluate policy instruments individually and not as part of a broader mix of
instruments (Connor et al. 2008a, 2009; Loomis and Allen 2008; Muller et al. 2009;
Muller and Mendelsohn 2009; Ward et al. 2008). The policy mix harnesses the
strengths of individual policy instruments while compensating for their weaknesses
by the use of additional complementary instruments (Gunningham and Sinclair 2005;
de Loë and Bjornlund 2008). Our results are also consistent with other studies
(Gunningham and Sinclair 2005; de Loë and Bjornlund 2008; Sarker et al. 2008)
which found that a mix of policy instruments is more likely to outperform any
single instrument especially where there are multiple impediments to adoption. The
sequencing of policy instruments is probably as important as the instrument mix
and targeting. We followed the two principles that effective policy: employs less
interventionist measures first, and; addresses the most important impediments to
adoption first. These two principles were complementary in our case study (suasion
and incentives were suggested to address the impediments of Knowledge Access,
Trainer/Advisor Proficiency, Financial Resources (Landholders)). However, in some
other catchments these principles may conflict (e.g. the most important impediment
may need to be addressed by regulation). Some pragmatic compromise between
these principles may be required in some catchments.
Critical to the mix, sequencing, and targeting of policy instruments is the need
for a detailed understanding of the catchment-specific context of the water quality
problem. In line with other studies (Davies and Hodge 2006; Bewsell et al. 2007; Kim
et al. 2008) the landholder survey was found to be a useful tool for identifying the
attitudes, impediments and drivers of management adoption amongst landholders
(Bewsell et al. 2007). In this case, the survey provided an understanding of the broad
impediments to and perceived benefits of adoption of water quality management.
However, this broad understanding was only able to suggest an equally broad
class of policy type (e.g. suasion, incentives, regulation). A deeper understanding
of the catchment context was required to inform the design of an effective mix
and scheduling of specific policy instruments (e.g. code of practice). This reinforces
the importance of understanding the complexity of agricultural non-point source
pollution and using diverse policy mechanisms to effectively address it (Gunningham
and Sinclair 2005; Greiner and Miller 2008; Prokopy et al. 2008, see also Jones et al.
2010).
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The quantitative aspect of the multi-criteria evaluation supported effective policy
design by providing structure and transparency to the complex decision making
process, and clarified trade-offs. The process accommodated the views of various
stakeholders and groups with the ultimate goal of achieving compromise and con-
sensus on the preferred policy scenario (Muller et al. 2009). The deliberative aspect
of the multi-criteria evaluation process further enhanced the depth and breadth of
understanding of the issues surrounding water quality management in the catchment
in this study. This level of understanding was critical for tailoring an effective policy
mix and sequence in this case study and for effective design of agricultural non-point
source pollution policy in other catchments.
We recognize three main limitations to this study. First, numbers of local landhold-
ers attending the two community fora were low (10 and 6). The initial landholder
survey captured the breadth of issues around water quality, complemented by the
community fora which aimed to deepen understanding of catchment context. Whilst
large numbers of participants is not necessarily and advantage when qualitative
depth is an objective, with low numbers there is a risk of nuanced responses from
individual participants. Second, through both the survey and the DMCE process,
participants (especially the more politically savvy dairy farmers), may have been
motivated to over-estimate rates of adoption. Thereby, the relative contribution
of non-dairy livestock graziers to agricultural non-point source pollution may be
understated. Third, we did not consider in detail how some of the policy instruments
may be operationalised or implemented on the ground to enable a comprehensive
assessment of transaction costs of implementing policy instruments. We recognize
that transaction costs may affect the final policy decisions by government.
5 Conclusion
In this study, a mix of complementary policy instruments was necessary to address
key impediments to the adoption of water quality management. Policy addressing
the most important impediments first is more likely to achieve the rates of adoption
required to meet water quality and human health targets in water supply catchments.
Adoption may be further enhanced by the sequencing of instruments to start with
encouragement and end with enforcement, and through the targeting the biggest
polluters. The combination of a landholder survey and DMCE process in this study
provided catchment-specific contextual information necessary to construct a targeted
mix and sequence of policy instruments to achieve widespread adoption of water
quality management. The techniques applied in this case study are applicable to
the effective mitigation of agricultural non-point source pollution in drinking water
supply catchments worldwide.
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